1977
Additional Protocol 1 to 1949 Geneva Conventions: “...enemy civilians can justifiably be killed provided that their death was neither the outcome of a deliberate attack, nor the result of a disproportionate use of force.”[1]
This page will give you the landmark events in history related to the U.S. drone campaign in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, & Yemen. Our timeline is segmented by presidential era, which you may skip ahead to:
Additional Protocol 1 to 1949 Geneva Conventions: “...enemy civilians can justifiably be killed provided that their death was neither the outcome of a deliberate attack, nor the result of a disproportionate use of force.”[1]
Casualty-aversion and civilian protection become two central characteristics of American warfare.[2]
George W. Bush is innaugurated into office as the 42nd president of the United States.
9/11 attacks were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda against the United States and noted as “the deadliest terrorist attack in human history.”
After the attacks of 9/11, partnership quickly intensified between the United States and the Yemeni government.[3]
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) is passed, which is used as the primary claim of legal authority worldwide operations against terrorist operatives related to 9/11 and to prevent future international terrorism against the U.S.
Under the codename Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A), the U.S. invades and begins the war in Afghanistan.
THE FIRST DRONE STRIKE IN HISTORY
A UAV being remote-controlled by CIA officers took off from a U.S. air base in Uzbekistan, crossed the border into Afghanistan, and started tracking a convoy of vehicles believed to be carrying jihadi leaders along a road in Kabul.
As the convoy approached a building, the UAV fired two Hellfire missiles at the building at the push of a button. Among the dead was Mohammed Atef, al-Qaida’s military chief and Osama Bin Laden’s son-in-law.[4]
al-Qaeda given sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region, after being based in Aghanistan from 1996-2001.[5]
The CIA launched a Hellfire missile from a Predator drone in retaliation for the attack on the USS Cole by al-Qaeda's Yemeni branch in 2000. This is the first strike in a drone-based counterterrorism program in Yemen.[6]
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism begins recording data on drone strikes in Pakistan.
Bush obtained permission from Pakistani President Perves Musharraf to kill senior Al-Qaeda target in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) using Predator drones. Additional evidence shows Pakistani consent and even aid in U.S. strikes.[7]
al-Qaeda in Yemen and al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia unite, forming al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the focus of U.S. operations in Yemen since.[8]
Somalia's interim President Abdullahi Yusuf backs U.S. airstrikes helicopters and AC-130 gunships.[9]
Barack Obama is innaugurated into office as the 43rd president of the United States.
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism begins an extensive study on drone strikes in Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan.
Region-wide uprisings lead to the attack on President Saleh's compound, marking the beginning of Yemen's Arab Spring.[10]
President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi acknowledges consenting to and approving U.S. drone strikes on Yemen.[11]
Attorney General Eric Holder defends legitimacy of strikes on al-Qaeda as attacks against a declared enemy of the U.S., and without a specified temporal or geographic limit, saying “indeed Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan… our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.”[12]
After over a decade of operations, the Obama administration publicly acknowledges its covert drone programme for the first time.[13]
Yemeni government takes control of southern regions controlled by Ansar al-Shari'a Yemen (ASY), an organization including al-Qaeda, using forces supported by U.S. drone strikes.[14]
Two waves of strikes targeting border village of Zowi Sidgi (Afghanistan & Pakistan). All injured and killed were civilians.[15]
Report by NYU and Stanford reveals that members of Al-Qaeda learned to avoid tribal areas of Pakistan after drone strikes started.[16]
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud meets with President Obama asking for more US military help. He communicates support for U.S. drone strikes against foreign fighters in somalia as long as they do not kill Somali citizens.[17]
NBC leaks a government white paper justifying the use of drones against terrorism suspects, including US citizens, without requiring “clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future.”[18]
President Obama issues the Presidential Policy Guidance, tightened procedures for use of drone strikes including standards that targets must be “a continuing, imminent threat to Americans” and a “near certainty” that there would be no civilian casualties.[19]
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif withdraws consent to U.S. drone strikes on Pakistan, condemning the strikes as a “violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”[20]
The U.S. stops operating with allies in the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force, leaving only the U.S. and Afghanistan flying strike missions in the Afghanistan.[21]
Yemeni President Hadi is forced to resign after the Houthi rebels take over the government.
Online magazine The Intercept released a chain of leaked documents, "The Drone Papers." These showed bureaucratic processes supporting U.S. drone wars and moved that assassination by military drones is a central tool in the U.S. counterterrorism policy.[22]
“President Barack Obama received an open letter from four U.S. air force whistleblowers...exemplified an increasing unease and skepticism about the use of drones in ‘targeted killing,’ a skepticism that challenged the Obama Administration’s steadfast assurances that drone strikes are just as legal as they are ethical and wise.”[23]
U.S. Presidential candidate Donald Trump makes a public statement when asked about fighting ISIS and minimizing civilian casualties, saying “The other thing with the terrorists is you have to take out their families, when you get these terrorists, you have to take out their families. They care about their lives, don't kid yourself. When they say they don't care about their lives, you have to take out their families.”[24]
Despite having stopped leaving going after the Taliban to Afghan forces in January 2015, the U.S. goes on the offensive against the Taliban under “strategic effect” strikes.[25]
President Obama designates the al-Shabaab militant group in Somalia as an al-Qaeda affiliate.[26]
Investigative journalists & attorney Jame Jaffer publishes The Drone Memos. This text provided first fact-based insight about the legal documents and policies underlying U.S. drone operations.[27]
Donald J. Trump is innaugurated into office as the 44th president of the United States.
President Trump declares parts of Yemen and Somalia to be “areas of active hostilities,” allowing the US military to carry out drone strikes without presidential approval.[28]
The Trump administration begins dismantling Obama-era guidelines, including the high-level vetting of proposed drone strikes, the limitation to only targeting “continuing and imminent threats,” and protections against civilian deaths.[29]
Academic paper analyzing the effectiveness of the drone campaign on AQAP shows that despite the longstanding counterterrorism program and countless loss of innocent lives, the drone campaign has made no major setback in AQAP's ability to perpetrate lethal attacks in the U.S. and Western Europe.[30]
[1] Kaempf, Sebastian. "US Warfare in Somalia and the Trade-off between Casualty-Aversion and Civilian Protection." Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 23, no. 3, 2012, pp. 388–413., doi:10.1080/09592318.2012.661608.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Hudson, Leila, et al. "Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates Through Counterterrorism?" Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 3, 2012, pp. 142–156., doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00554.x.
[4] Kaplan, Fred. "The First Drone Strike: How a Cold War Idea Became the Dominant Weapon in the War on Terror." Slate Magazine, Slate, 14 Sept. 2016, www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_next_20/2016/09/a_history_of_the_armed_drone.html.
[5] Gunaratna, Rohan, and Anders Nielsen. "Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30 Dec. 2008, pp. 775–807., doi:10.1080/10576100802291568.
[6] Hudson, Leila, et al. "Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates Through Counterterrorism?" Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 3, 2012, pp. 142–156., doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00554.x.
[7] Plaw, Avery, et al. "Practice Makes Perfect?: The Changing Civilian Toll of CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan." Perspectives on Terrorism, Dec. 2011, pp. 51–69., doi:10.21236/ada599423.
[8] "Yemen: Reported US covert actions 2018," The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2018.
[9] "Somalia: Reported US covert actions 2018," The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/somalia-reported-us-actions-2018.
[10] Hudson, Leila, et al. "Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates Through Counterterrorism?" Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 3, 2012, pp. 142–156., doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00554.x.
[11] Miller, Greg. "Yemeni President Acknowledges Approving U.S. Drone Strikes." The Washington Post, WP Company, 29 Sept. 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/yemeni-president-acknowledges-approving-us-drone-strikes/2012/09/29/09bec2ae-0a56-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_story.html.
[12] Boyle, Michael J. "The Legal and Ethical Implications of Drone Warfare." Legal and Ethical Implications of Drone Warfare, 2015, pp. 1–22., doi:10.4324/9781315473451-1.
[13] Brennan, Josh O. "Transcript of Remarks by John O. Brennan, 'The Efficacy and Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy.'" Wilson Center, 30 Apr. 2012, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy.
[14] Zelin, Aaron Y. "Know Your Ansar Al-Sharia." Foreign Policy, 21 Sept. 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/21/know-your-ansar-al-sharia/.
[15] Chen, Kai. "Invisible Victims of Drone Strikes in Afghanistan." Peace Review, vol. 27, no. 4, 2015, pp. 456–460., doi:10.1080/10402659.2015.1094326.
[16] Aslam, Wali. "Great-Power Responsibility, Side-Effect Harms and American Drone Strikes in Pakistan." Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 15, no. 2, Feb. 2016, pp. 143–162., doi:10.1080/15027570.2016.1211867.
[17] Rogin, Josh. "Somali President Asks for More American Help." Foreign Policy, 18 Jan. 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/18/somali-president-asks-for-more-american-help/.
[18] Breitenbücher, Danielle. "U.S., Lethal Operations against Al-Qa'Ida Leaders." ICRC Law, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/us-lethal-operations-against-al-qaida-leaders.
[19] "Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities." 2013, www.documentcloud.org/documents/3006440-Presidential-Policy-Guidance-May-2013-Targeted.html.
[20] Lewis, Michael W. "Guest Post: Pakistan's Official Withdrawal of Consent for Drone Strikes." Opinio Juris, 10 June 2013, https://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/10/guest-post-pakistans-official-withdrawal-of-consent-for-drone-strikes/.
[21] Purkiss, Jessica, and Abigail Fielding-Smith. "Afghanistan: Reported US Covert Actions 2018." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2018, www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/afghanistan-reported-us-covert-actions-2018.
[22] Maurer, Kathrin, and Andreas Immanuel Graae. "Introduction: Debating Drones: Politics, Media, and Aesthetics." Politik, 2017, http://findresearcher.sdu.dk/portal/files/143660924/Debating_Drones.pdf.
[23] Ibid.
[24] LoBianco, Tom. "Donald Trump on Terrorists: 'Take out Their Families.'" CNN, 3 Dec. 2015, www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-families/index.html.
[25] Purkiss, Jessica, and Abigail Fielding-Smith. "Afghanistan: Reported US Covert Actions 2018." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2018, www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/afghanistan-reported-us-covert-actions-2018.
[26] Purkiss, Jessica. "Trump's First Year in Numbers: Strikes Triple in Yemen and Somalia." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 19 Jan. 2018, www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/afghanistan-reported-us-covert-actions-2018.
[27] Maurer, Kathrin, and Andreas Immanuel Graae. "Introduction: Debating Drones: Politics, Media, and Aesthetics." Politik , 2017, http://findresearcher.sdu.dk/portal/files/143660924/Debating_Drones.pdf.
[28] Kube, Courtney, et al. "U.S. Airstrikes against Yemen Terror Groups Grew Sixfold under Trump." NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News Group, 1 Feb. 2018, www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/u-s-airstrikes-yemen-have-increased-sixfold-under-trump-n843886.
[29] Savage, Charlie, and Eric Schmitt. "Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and Commando Raids." The New York Times, The New York Times, 21 Sept. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html.
[30] Bolland, Thomas, and Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen. "'No Boots on the Ground': the Effectiveness of US Drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula." Defense & Security Analysis, vol. 34, no. 2, Mar. 2018, pp. 127–143., doi:10.1080/14751798.2018.1478184.