

the resistance drone strikes face. The article describes how the Obama administration has chosen to interpret the principles and dimensions of legal authority, the nature of the targets, drone usage, transparency and precedent, and precedent. Understanding of how the US defines certain criteria is crucial in understanding the the extent of government support for drone strikes, yet difficult to obtain as the government will often not publicly declare its stances. This article combines the statements from officials from the government and CIA, piecing together the criteria and definitions which influence drone warfare policies. This information is crucial in understanding how qualifications of attacks and policies such as the principle of proportionality and principle of distinction have been and will continue to be justified. It is also useful in describing how moral and legal dilemmas, while not new in warfare, may be exaggerated or accelerated towards particular trends and responses by external forces.

Brookman-Byrne, Max. "Drone Use 'Outside Areas of Active Hostilities': An Examination of the Legal Paradigms Governing US Covert Remote Strikes." *Netherlands International Law Review* 64, no. 1 (April 1, 2017): 3–41. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-017-0078-1>.

This article examines whether or not legal frameworks pertaining to drone strikes in armed conflicts can still be applied to covert drone strikes on what the United States has described as "outside areas of active hostilities," most of which are regions within Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Byrne argues that the classification of "outside areas of active hostilities" uses legal language to sidestep international human rights laws(IHRL) that place restrictions on drone strikes, demonstrating how the US legitimizes illicit use of military force. Byrne notes that covert uses of drones have been against non-state actors (ex. Al-Qaeda) with the US suggesting that armed conflict does not have to be between international governments in order to justify military use of force. However, he argues that the US's interpretation of international humanitarian laws are not only presumptively applied to Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, but "counter to the global trend surrounding the regulation of hostilities towards the increased expansion of IHRL obligations into armed conflict"(38). Byrne applies IHRL frameworks to evidence collected from international news sources as well as data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism's drone wars dataset. His work is important because it examines the legal and political justifications for covert drone operations, rather than the US's general use of drone strikes in military combat. He also uses the same dataset as our project, providing an example of how the data can be analyzed within the context of international and human rights laws. His research is helpful for our project, in that it also provides context for covert drone operations in "outside areas of active hostilities" within Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, areas that have received sparse coverage by news agencies.

Byrne, Max. "Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of 'Intervention by Invitation' as a Basis for US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen." *Journal on the Use of Force and International Law* 3, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 97–125. <https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2015.1135658>.

This article uses existing domestic and international legal frameworks to understand the lawfulness of use of force in US drone warfare. Byrne ultimately argues that although the circumstances that contextualized the use of force were different across the countries of Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, the United States still operated in the frameworks for consent established by international bodies, making its drone strikes legal; however, Byrne concludes that his findings expose the problematic nature of international doctrines for consent, especially when they can be interpreted in ways that justify acts of violence. Using the conditions that “consent must be valid,” “consent must be given by a legitimate government,” “consent must be given by a requisite official,” and that breach of international law—particularly through armed conflict—is the exception to doctrines of consent, Byrne applies the legal frameworks to his historical analysis of the political environments in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. This resource is important because it analyzes the United States’ legal justification of drone warfare as well as the involvement and attitudes of the nations that were targeted. Understanding the political and legal justifications creates a necessary context to analyzing why the drone strikes occurred in the particular geographical areas that our project examines. The article is also key to understanding ways in which the governments of Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan may have been complicit with US’s actions as well as the ways in which the welfare of their citizens might have been excluded from legal and political frameworks.

Chen, Kai. "Invisible Victims of Drone Strikes in Afghanistan." *Peace Review* 27, no. 4 (2015): 456-60. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2015.1094326>

Kai argues that the use of drones in warfare produce more civilian casualties and US reparations to victims families are insufficient compared to rates other countries receive. The author utilizes a combination of academic work as well as news articles. This article is important as it acknowledges the absence of data from Afghanistan and seeks to compile sources on the issue. The source addresses Afghanistan’s data absence, provides more political context to the warfare in the country, and provides additional links to articles for further exploration.

Hudson, L., Owens, C. S., & Callen, D. J. (2012). “DRONE WARFARE IN YEMEN: FOSTERING EMIRATES THROUGH COUNTERTERRORISM?,” *Middle East Policy*. 142-156. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00554.x>

In this article, the authors track the evolution of drone warfare in Yemen beginning with the alliance of US and Yemeni state powers post-9/11. They specifically antagonize drone warfare by claiming that it has incited anti-American sentiments among Yemeni people and mistrust of the Yemeni government, who spread misinformation by taking responsibility for airstrikes despite having come from the U.S. The authors suggest that Obama’s redefined warfare by replacing conventional invasion with acts of covert violations of sovereignty (w/ drones). In removing counterinsurgency from the equation, this new strategy actually has the potential to create an entrenched culture of insurgency, as sustained insecurity leads to alternative forms of governance: Emirates.

Johnston, P., Sarbahi, A. (2016). "The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan," *International Studies Quarterly*. 203-219. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv004>

This article claims that the correlation of increase in drone strikes and decrease in occurrences and lethality of terrorist attacks is a result of short-term decreases in terrorist violence. The effect of new technology that allows for remote surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting are sufficient in disrupting and degrading militant organizations and reducing violence in the surrounding area for a few weeks. The data uses data of US drone strikes in agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan from 2007 to 2011. This data included a spatial panel data analysis, which took into account moving their bases and action away from strike areas is not an actual decrease in activity by also including considering militant activity in neighboring areas including eastern Afghanistan. In understanding the long term implications of drone strikes, these results are helpful in describing how the responses of militant groups will change the effect of the strikes. The findings suggest that the application of continual pressure and reassessment is important to maintain leverage of their current technological advantages.

Kaempf, Sebastian. "US Warfare in Somalia and the Trade-off between Casualty-aversion and Civilian Protection." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 3 (2012): 388-413. doi:10.1080/09592318.2012.661608. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.661608>

"US Warfare in Somalia" explores how asymmetric warfare plays a role in the ensuring the American values of casualty-aversion and civilian protection. This article uses a variety of different sources, the majority of which are from academic journals and with some from newspaper publications. Kaempf does not focus on drones but discusses larger themes of US-Somalia relations that would be valuable to consider for context. This information is absolutely valuable in terms of forming our thesis as it provides history and context of the frameworks behind the US' initiation of drone warfare.

Lubell, Noam, and Nathan Derejko. "A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict." *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 11, no. 1 (March 2013): 65-88. <https://doi.org/doi.10.1093/jicj/mqsO96>.

Lubell and Derejko argue that discrepancies between the location of drone strikes and battlefield classifications created by international humanitarian laws are challenging geographical and legal understandings of armed conflict. While traditional armed conflict can be geographically isolated to specific locations and regions, drone warfare is creating a "global battlefield," in which "the entire planned is subject to the application of the laws of armed conflict and the consequences that flow from it" (67). The authors note that drone strikes in Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia experienced drone strikes that were largely outside the legally and internationally recognized areas of

“active battlefields.” They then apply different classification systems created by international humanitarian laws to the areas impacted by extraterritorial drone warfare to understand how these classification systems may be insufficient at regulating them. This resource is important because it examines how drone warfare is impacting military, humanitarian, and legal understandings of geography which, in turn, is important to consider for the mapping aspects of our project.

Maurer, Kathrin and Andreas Immanuel Graae. "Introduction: Debating Drones: Politics, Media, and Aesthetics." *Politik* 20, no. 1 (2017): 4.
<https://tidsskrift.dk/politik/article/download/27640/24362/>.

This article analyzes drone strikes through an intersectional lens and aims to “promote a critical consciousness about drone operations and to shape an understanding that drone warfare cannot be analyzed and explained in a mono-disciplinary fashion, but rather that its complexity demands expertise from a wide arrange of scholars.” The authors utilize other peer-reviewed articles as references. This resource is important as it provides a kind of meta-analysis of the data surrounding drone wars and discusses important topics such as “asymmetrical warfare” and portrayals of drone warfare in media. *Debating Drones’* critical, holistic framework is valuable in terms of forming our own representation of drone wars and the contexts that surround the issue.

This article examines whether or not legal frameworks pertaining to drone strikes in armed conflicts can still be applied to covert drone strikes on what the United States has described as “outside areas of active hostilities,” most of which are regions within Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Byrne argues that the classification of “outside areas of active hostilities” uses legal language to sidestep international human rights laws(IHRL) that limit drone operations to instances that involve international armed conflicts, demonstrating how the US legitimizes illicit use of military force. Byrne notes that covert uses of drones have been against non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda, suggesting that armed conflict does not have to be between international governments in order to justify military use of force. However, he argues that the US’s interpretation of international humanitarian laws are not only presumptively applied to Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, but “counter to the global trend surrounding the regulation of hostilities towards the increased expansion of IHRL obligations into armed conflict” (38). Byrne applies IHRL frameworks to evidence collected from international news sources as well as data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s drone wars dataset. His work is important because it examines the legal and political justifications for covert drone operations, rather than the US’s general use of drone strikes in military combat. He also uses the same dataset as our project, providing an example of how the data can be analyzed within the context of international and human rights laws. His research is helpful for our project, in that it also provides context for covert drone operations in “outside areas of active

hostilities” within Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, areas that have received sparse coverage by news agencies.

Plaw, A., Friker, M., Williams, B. (2011). “Practice Makes Perfect? The Changing Civilian Toll of CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” *Terrorism Research Institute*. 51-69.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298539>

This article examines and finds support for the CIA claims that drone strikes in Pakistan have reduced civilian casualties, despite an increase in overall strikes. It attributes the decrease in civilian toll to both procedural adjustments towards better awareness, caution, and restraint, as well as improvements in the technology devices themselves. Three independent databases, the *Long Journal War*, the New America Foundation, and the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth Research on Operational Neutralization Events, were used in analyzing the reported civilian deaths as a result of CIA drone strikes in FATA, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. While each dataset was compiled from different Pakistani and international press reports and had its own biases in terms of classification tendencies, this ultimately strengthened the trends that were found across all three databases. This article, published in 2011, specifically focuses on the immediately recent decrease in civilian deaths in Pakistan between 2009 and 2010, and shows how different and independent research and sources can provide an overall corroboration for an overall claim. These findings are significant in that they provided a likely basis for the US to justify maintaining and even increasing drone strikes as an effective, precise, and relatively humane form of self-defense, findings which continue to have crucial impact on current interpretations and policies of drone strikes.

Scahill, Jeremy. “The Assassination Complex: Inside the Government’s Secret Drone Warfare Program.” *Simon and Schuster*. 155-211. <https://bit.ly/2PzcVe4> (requested book to be delivered to YRL from another UC campus)

Scahill’s book argues the inconsistencies of documentation provided by the United States on drone strikes. Driven by information by a whistleblower in the CIA and seen in the classified released information in *The Intercept*, this book seeks to expose the inner truth behind the drone warfare program. Since we are using information from the government for our dataset, this book is important because it provides a different perspective to the issues and reveals where some of our data might be inconsistent with reality. By providing insight into which parts of the dataset are reliable, and which we should question during our analysis, Scahill’s book proves a significant resource to our team’s thesis.

Thomas Bolland & Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen. (2018). “No boots on the ground: the effectiveness of US drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” *Defense & Security Analysis*. 127-143. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1478184>

The authors of this article are trying to examine the effectiveness of the drone campaign in Yemen against AQAP. To do this, they first position the drone campaign as being

explicitly counterterrorist, thus, it must assist in the dismantling or inhibition of AQAP procedures. The authors draw on the theoretical model posited by Javier Jordan in order to analyze drone warfare effectiveness. In Jordan's model, drones are an independent variable while the dependent variable is the terrorist organisation's (here AQAP's) "ability to perpetrate lethal attacks in the US and Western-Europe." Accordingly, Jordan's intervening variables relate to hierarchical structure, qualified human resources and key material resources; the authors, however, present an additional variable: target correspondence. The article went on analyzing how despite the years of drone airstrikes, AQAP remains quite tenacious. The killing of several key members, leaders even, has not posed a great setback; in fact, AQAP remains structurally, economically, and materially unshaken. The author's new variable, target correspondence, actually gives insight into the animosity Yemeni people hold towards the US. This in turn allows AQAP a greater capacity for recruitment. Overall, the authors conclude that "drones, despite temporarily degrading AQAP's qualified human resources, have been largely ineffective."

Williams, Brian Glyn. (2010). "The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 871-892. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.508483>

The author of this article attempts to show the discrepancies in data and public opinion surrounding the drone-enabled airstrikes in the FATA region of Pakistan. The author first gives a brief history of drone warfare in the FATA region and then presents three different arguments around the covert strikes. "Hypothesis A" argues for the deployment of drones, as they might be the only means of fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the FATA region. Here, it is argued that drones can "go places soldiers can't" and that the precision of strikes is greater than ever before, limiting civilian casualty compared to conventional "boots-on-the-ground." This is in direct contention with "Hypothesis B," which articulates the discrepancy between American and Pakistani data collection and journalism. While Pakistani media sources have made claims of hundreds of civilian deaths in the strikes, the Pentagon has reported that about 80 missile attacks from drones in less than two years killed "more than 400" enemy fighters and put civilian deaths in low double digits. It is important to consider, however, that Pakistani media has reported Taliban pronouncements as "facts" and are extremely anti-American. The third position the author covers, "Hypothesis C," goes into the complex landscape of public opinion about America's drone campaign among Pashtun people. Despite the heavy mistrust of the Pakistani government, who frequently lied and denounced knowledge of US drone attacks, a few polls showed that more people side with the Pakistani government over the Taliban or Al-Qaeda groups. Overall, the author concludes that there is no denying that the swift, covert operations of the drone campaign posed a huge setback in terrorist organizations' ability to operate. What this article gives insight into is the complexity of international press/journalism relative to fact-sharing or "truth," and the deployment of misinformation by the state in both the US and Pakistan. This is significant to our project because it then poses the question of whose data/records/reporting did the Bureau of Investigative Journalism find worthy of legitimizing? Does the database report data from

the Taliban? How, as researchers, do we analyze the situation, if drone warfare capitalizes off the opportunity of misinformation from state powers?